




MASTER’S FINAL PROJECT 













Accident simulations of toxic gaseous emissions, 
fires and explosions in industrial facilities and 
their effect on a nearby hospital 
Author 
Róger Valverde Jiménez 




Dr. Jaime Gimenez Farreras 
Department of Chemical Engineering 
University of Barcelona 
 
DE BARCELO 








I thank God for the opportunity to have lived this experience in Barcelona and the 
authorities of the CCSS that approved the scholarship. I am honored that the “Gerencia 
de Infraestructura y Tecnologías” y the “Dirección de Administración de Proyectos 
Especiales” have trusted on me for this great responsibility. 
 
Of course I thank my family, whom I love more than anything and anyone in this world 
and who have always been supporting me from afar but making me fell very close to 
them: my wife Maricarmen, my children Montserrat and Gabriel, my parents Jorge and 
Carmen, and all the other relatives who have been taking care of me. Also to my friends 
and colleagues from Costa Rica as well as the new ones I made here, who have served as 
support in study, sport and recreation. 
 
It was hard!!! 
 
DE BARCELO 





CCSS is a public entity in charge of providing health and social security services for all 
the people of Costa Rica (anyone). A hospital, that is planned to be developed in the 
future, is located close to an industrial and residential zone, where there are companies 
that manage hazardous chemical substances. This situation represents a risk for hospital 
users and general habitants in case of industrial accidents like toxic gaseous emissions to 
the atmosphere, fires and blasts.  
As part of a preliminary investigation and academic exercise, three sites that store this 
type of chemical compounds near the hospital’s property were defined and designated as 
Sites A, B and C. At Site A, ammonium hydroxide is stored in 30% (w/w) solution; at 
Site B, nitric acid is preserved in solution at 70% (w/w) and Site C contains liquefied 
highly flammable dimethylamine within a pressurized tank. Therefore, considering 
flammability and storage conditions with the objective of analyzing eventual 
consequences, seven scenarios of accidents were planned to study and simulate. For this 
analysis, ALOHA software was applied, using meteorological data from Costa Rica and 
comparing the results with the corresponding Spanish legislation (“Real Decreto 
1196/2003”), due to the lack of this kind of Costa Rican regulations. From the point of 
view of the hospital’s property, the following results were obtained: 
 At scenario 1 (Site A), a spill of aqueous ammonia that forms a pool was defined. It 
produces a toxic area of vapor cloud that reaches AEGL-1 (alert zone), which 
represents an impact extension on 4,100 m2. 
 At scenario 2 (Site B), a spill of nitric acid that forms a pool was defined. It produces 
a toxic area of vapor cloud that reaches AEGL-1 (alert zone), which represents an 
impact extension on 11,500 m2. 
 At scenario 3 (Site C), a not burning leaking tank of dimethylamine was defined. It 
produces a toxic area of vapor cloud which does not impact the hospital. 
 At scenario 4 (Site C), an ignition of dimethylamine’s toxic vapor cloud was defined. 
It produces a flash fire which does not impact the hospital. 
 At scenario 5 (Site C), a blast from the flash fire of dimethylamine was defined. It 
produces an overpressure which does not impact the hospital. 
 At scenario 6 (Site C), a jet fire from a leaking tank of dimethylamine was defined. It 
produces thermal radiation area which does not impact the hospital. 
 
 
 At scenario 7 (Site C), a BLEVE and fireball/pool fire from a leaking tank of 
dimethylamine was defined. It produces thermal radiation area that reaches more than 
5 psi (intervention zone), which represents an impact extension on 33,914 m2. 
Variations in wind direction could change the distribution of the consequences on the 
hospital’s property (for all the simulated scenarios). Because of this, it is for sure that the 
obtained results are not static or definitive. So, considering hospital patients as a critical 
population group and according to the “Real Decreto 1196/2003”, it is not advisable to 
unify industrial production areas where hazardous chemicals are managed, with 
residences and hospitals in the same alert zone. Therefore, they must not coexist. 
It is important to take into account that a hospital can never stop working and must also 
be solvent in dealing with emergency situations. Therefore, any impact to human health 
of people outside the hospital’s property (in any of the scenarios) will indirectly affect 
this facility, as these people will attend to it for medical care and will saturate its services. 
This means that as part of the operations and organization of the hospital, it is necessary 
to plan and anticipate what to do in such case. If the hospital does not have sufficient 
response capacity to care for those affected, it will have to refer them to other health 
centers, consuming resources and valuable time that would put the people at greater risk. 
Because the CCSS is not subject to the regulations of the “Real Decreto 1196/2003”, it 
should consider the results of this project, in order to promote a teamwork group with 
agrochemical industry companies that surround the hospital for evaluating the risk of 
toxic, radiative or overpressure pollution about accidents related with spills, leaks, fires 
and explosions. Also, given that the hospital has not been designed yet, the CCSS should 
incorporate in the construction plans, solutions in infrastructure and resistance of 
materials to the fire, suitable electromechanical connections and many other aspects that 
mitigate the impact of the accidents considered in this MFP. 
The agrochemical companies at Sites A, B and C, in order to promote the safety of the 
infrastructure, their occupants and neighbors, should also update their facilities 
considering the recommendations in the “Manual de Disposiciones Técnicas Generales 
Sobre Seguridad Humana y Protección Contra Incendios”. And finally, it would be 
important to generate a plan so that preventive and corrective actions could be taken into 
account to reinforce primary control systems through operational tasks or projects.   
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CCSS is a public entity in charge of providing health and social security services for all 
the people of Costa Rica (anyone). The insurance covers all the country, for which it has 
more than 1,300 healthcare centers that sums more than 1,200,000 square meters in 
infrastructure. 
Since its distribution is so widespread in the territory, its facilities are often close to 
multiple types of buildings, according to the municipal land use and urban regulations. 
Thus, it is not atypical to find a healthcare center located into a mixed urban zone 
(industrial and residential). In this case, a hospital will be built relatively close to a zone, 
where hazardous chemicals are managed, mainly for agricultural use. Obviously, this 
situation represents a risk for hospital users (internal staff, patients -whose normal 
physiological capacity is diminished- and clients in general) and habitants, in case of 
emission accidents of toxic substances to the atmosphere or events related with fires or 
blasts. 
In the present study, it is assumed from an academic point of view, that, around the 
mentioned hospital, there are three agrochemical companies handling dangerous 
substances, in which industrial accidents may occur. Taking this into account and 
according to the weather conditions of the zone, it is necessary to determine the 
consequences to human health in the event of such accidents according to the related 
regulations and also, establish if hospital and this kind of industries can coexist closely in 
the same zone. 
In any case, the study is important for the general population because, if an accident of 
this type occurs and even though the immission might not reach the hospital’s property, 
the affected people do will need medical support in the same hospital and could saturate 
the resolutive capacity of it. Therefore, to avoid this chaotic situation, a planned response 
is necessary. 
The study has as a significant restriction to access the actual information about types and 
amounts of chemical substances that are produced and / or stored in the mentioned sites, 
as well as the variability of the processes and lines of production that are developed there. 
This means that the quantities and compounds to be analyzed may differ according to the 
modifications of their inventories or the chemical and industrial processes they apply. So 
DE BARCELO 
Master’s Final Project    Róger Valverde Jiménez                                               
  
NA                                               
2 
 
the present MFP cannot be considered as a formal and official public document, it is an 
academic and hypothetical exercise. 
Therefore, it is proposed that according to the results and trends obtained in this MFP, it 
will be coordinated with these private companies to jointly study the situation considering 
much more facts and data to integrate a global response that also could involve other 
public and private organizations for the proper management of emergencies. 
 
1.1.Location of the hospital in relation to the agrochemical industry and existence of 
hazardous chemicals 
The location of the hospital was defined as a ground surface or area of coverage, which 
will contemplate the infrastructure of the hospital (includes buildings, parking lots, engine 
room, internal streets, and any related facility). It has not been designed yet. 
Once the future hospital was located, a review of the surrounding area was carried out to 
determine the number of existing agrochemical companies. Each one was consulted via 
telephone or e-mail about the dangerous chemicals and process conditions they manage 
and how are stored, whether pressurized or not. Those industries that only handled 
granulated agrochemicals (most of them) were discarded, due to the stability of the final 
product to melt and evaporate at ambient temperature. 
Once the information was collected, a visit was made to the chosen organizations to get 
a better idea of the management they carry out with the dangerous compounds and the 
safety measures applied. About the specific manufacturing processes, the companies were 
more hermetic when providing information. Also, due to aspects of market competition, 
they did not want to explain in detail how much they produce monthly, just how much 
dangerous substances are usually stored (information on inventory management was not 
provided).  
It is emphasized that despite having received the collaboration of these private companies, 
they wish not to be mentioned their name in the present work, even though they showed 
openness in teaching the facilities. So, most of the obtained data was taken as a result of 
the visit and interviews carried out, that is to say, there are no official reports, trades or 
documents that support the collection of the data. 





So, if the results of the present study show that the hospital is at risk of being affected in 
the event of accidents in the surrounding agrochemical industry, companies are willing to 
collaborate more openly, provided there is an official request between the competent 
authority of the government and private organizations. This is because this industry has 
many years to exist and, as part of their operating permissions, they have never been asked 
for a similar analysis to this one, so because of the hospital is the one who has just arrived 
in the neighborhood, it needs to evaluate the existing risk conditions around it. 
 
1.2. Types of accidents in the agrochemical industry near the hospital 
Based on the technical assessment of the storage conditions of hazardous compounds in 
the agrochemical industry near the hospital, two fundamental aspects were determined. 
First, it was important to define the type of accident that could occur and second, to 
estimate the effects these accidents could generate. Thus, for the stored liquid chemicals 
that are related with this work (because there are many types of chemical accidents), the 
following events may occur (Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016): 
1) Accidents with toxic substances: 
a) Evaporating pool.  
b) Leaking tank (not burning).  
2) Accidents with flammable and toxic substances: 
a) Flash fire.  
b) Blast. 
c) Jet fire.  
d) BLEVE and fireball.  
e) Pool fire.  
For more details of each accident, see Attachment 1. 
 
1.3. Analytical models for described type of accidents, description, and simulation 
The mathematical models that form part of the analytical (but not exclusive) basis of most 
specialized commercial software to determine the dispersion of air pollutants, 
overpressures and thermal radiation are described below shortly. 
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1.3.1. The Gaussian air pollutant dispersion model 
The atmospheric dispersion models are also known as atmospheric diffusion models, air 
dispersion models, air quality models, and air pollution dispersion models. This modeling 
is the mathematical simulation of how air pollutants disperse in the atmosphere. It is 
performed with computer programs that solve the mathematical equations and algorithms 
which simulate the pollutant dispersion. The dispersion models are used to estimate or to 
predict the downwind concentration of air pollutants emitted from sources such as 
industrial plants, vehicular traffic, or accidental chemical releases. The results of 
dispersion modeling, using worst case accidental releases and meteorological conditions, 
can provide estimated locations of impacted areas, and be used to determine appropriate 
protective actions. 
The dispersion models vary depending on the assumptions used to develop the model, but 
all require the input of data that may include: 
 Meteorological conditions such as wind speed and direction, the amount of 
atmospheric turbulence (as characterized by what is called the “stability class”), the 
ambient air temperature, the height to the bottom of any inversion aloft that may be 
present, cloud cover and solar radiation. 
 The emission parameters such the type of source, the mass flow rate, the source 
location and height, the source exit velocity, and the source exit temperature. 
 Terrain elevations at the source location and at receptor locations, such as nearby 
homes, schools, businesses, and hospitals. 
 The location, height, and width of any obstructions (such as buildings or other 
structures) in the path of the emitted gaseous plume as well as the terrain surface 
roughness. 
Many of the modern, advanced dispersion modeling programs include a pre-processor 
module for the input of meteorological and other data, and many also include a post-
processor module for graphing the output data and/or plotting the area impacted by the 
air pollutants on maps. The plots of areas impacted usually include isopleths showing 
areas of pollutant concentrations that define areas of the highest health risk. The isopleths 
plots are useful in determining protective actions for the public and first responders. 
(Arzate, 2004). 





1.3.2. The heavy gas model and the models to analyze blasts and fires (flash fires, 
jet fires, BLEVEs and pool fires) 
Industrial gases are globally produced, processed, transported, and stored in considerable 
quantities. A significant portion of these gases are heavier than air due to their high 
molecular weight and/or the low temperatures associated with some accidental release 
scenarios. The most commonly used gases include flammable gases (liquefied petroleum 
gas and liquefied natural gas) as well as the toxic heavy gases (chlorine and ammonia). 
While light gases, due to densities lower than air, rise up and can be analyzed by the 
Gaussian model, the heavy gases sink to the ground, where they can spread and flow 
through uneven terrain. They can remain below ground for long periods of time 
potentially representing a danger to humans and environment and generally, can involve 
longer distances than light gases. (Dong et al, 2017) 
That is why the Gaussian model does not apply for analyzing the behavior of heavy gases. 
In this case, several adjustments must be made to develop a significant study. For the 
present work, and as will be explained further, the software ALOHA was chosen to make 
predictions. It is very clear about the internal logic that uses when applying the Gaussian 
model, which is the most used all over the world by the scientific community, commercial 
computational programs, and teaching centers.  
Nevertheless, in relation with heavy gases, ALOHA will automatically determine -based 
on the storage conditions, accident characteristics, the physical properties of the leaking 
compound and the meteorological conditions-, if it is more appropriate to use the heavy 
gases model instead of the Gauss model. Also, the results obtained are mainly graphs, so 
there is no tabulated data or calculation memory (formulas and process of calculus) to 
corroborate the estimates made. This is not atypical for this type of programs since most 
of them do not show the user the internal logic and the characteristics of each model, 
including the scientific basis of them.  
Similar to blasts and fires models, ALOHA does not clarify the type of equations and 
calculus that are applied for the analysis. In this sense, the interpretation value of the 
obtained results is emphasized over the process of its internal estimation. For a more 
detailed analysis, it is recommended to use specific software or models for blasts and 
fires, like for example, Bevi (RIVM, 2009) and “Yellow Book” (CPR, 2005). 
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1.4.Reference limits for gaseous concentrations of pollutants, overpressure and 
thermal radiation 
The results of applying each of the analytical models mentioned would not make sense 
without reference limits to compare them with. These ranges are explained below. 
1.4.1. Gaseous concentrations of pollutants 
In the case of the Gaussian and heavy gas models for sizing the affected areas according 
to the displacement of the toxic cloud and its concentrations, several LOCs of gaseous 
pollutants can be used, which are public exposure guidelines. Due to the lack of this kind 
of regulations in Costa Rica, this MFP was designed according to “Real Decreto 
1196/2003” (which is actually very restrictive) and the most common reference limits 
which are AEGLs, ERPGs, and TEELs, in that same order of priority. These 
concentrations limits were applied for emissions of 60 minutes, which is the maxima 
default lapse of time analysis used by ALOHA. For more details about LOCs, see 
Attachment 2. 
1.4.2. Explosive limits for flammable substances (flash fires)  
In addition to the aforementioned limits, for the case of the evaporation of flammable 
substances and in order to determine the displacement of the toxic cloud that can be 
burned if it is found with an ignition source, the concentrations defined by LEL and UEL 
are used. They both refer to the mixture’s proportion of a gaseous compound in the air. If 
the mixture of the gas is between LEL and UEL with a proper ignition source, it will burn. 
(Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
1.4.3. Overpressures limits for blasts  
Due to the lack of this kind of regulations in Costa Rica, this MFP was designed according 
to the overpressure values, indicated in “Real Decreto 1196/2003” that can be checked in 
Attachment 4. 
1.4.3. Thermal radiation limits for jet fires, pool fires and BLEVEs  
Due to the lack of this kind of regulations in Costa Rica, this MFP was designed according 
to the thermal radiation values for 30 seconds (time period available for both, intervention 
and alert zones), indicated in “Real Decreto 1196/2003” that can be checked in 
Attachment 5. 





1.5.  ALOHA: the software chosen for analysis 
Following the procedure, the USEPA’s and NOOA’s freeware ALOHA was chosen as 
the computer tool that making use of the mentioned mathematical models and depending 
on the introduced data, carries out the dispersion analysis of pollutants and the 
determination of overpressures and thermal radiation. ALOHA was designed to respond 
to emergency situations by estimating hazard zones associated with the emission of 
hazardous compounds. (ALOHA, 2016). 
ALOHA is used primarily for emergency response or planning situations, where the goal 
is to assess the threat posed to the general public by a chemical release. For toxic releases, 
ALOHA uses public exposure guidelines preferentially for the default toxic level of 
concerns (LOCs), because these guidelines are specifically designed to predict how the 
general public will respond to a short-term, one-time release. 
ALOHA's results can be unreliable when the following conditions exist: very low wind 
speeds, very stable atmospheric conditions, concentration patchiness -particularly near 
the release source- and wind shifts and terrain steering effects. 
ALOHA does not account for the effects of: byproducts from fires, explosions, or 
chemical reactions; particulates, chemical mixtures, terrain and hazardous fragments. The 
technical reasons for choosing ALOHA for this MFP are related to the criteria of the 
“Comisión Técnica de Prevención y Reparación de Daños Medioambientales del 
MAGRAMA”, see Attachment 3. 
 
2. Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to determine if a hospital can be reached by the toxic 
effects, overpressure or radiation associated to accidents in the surrounding agrochemical 
industry. In order to accomplish this objective, the following goals are proposed: 
 To define the scenarios of accidents in the agrochemical industry near the hospital 
related to emission of contaminants, blasts and fires. 
 To determine the concentrations of gaseous pollutants, overpressures and radiation on 
the hospital ground level against the corresponding exposure levels defined by 
legislation. 
 To set if the hospital’s property is at risk when being located close to this industry.  
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3. Results and discussions 
3.1.Location of the hospital and the agrochemical industry around it, as well as 
weather and geographical conditions of the zone 
As mentioned, the study area is the future hospital’s property, which is the site where the 
effects of dispersion of gaseous pollutants, overpressures and thermal radiation produced 
by accidents in the surrounding agrochemical industry will be analyzed. Three sites were 
found to store hazardous chemicals, which were designated by privacy policies as Site A, 




Figure 1. Location of hospital and surrounding sites 
where industrial accidents could happen. 
 
From the above figure, Site A is located at the northwest of the future hospital’s property. 
Site B is located at the east of this same zone and Site C at the southeast. It is noted that 
all of them, are single storied building type and that their surroundings are sheltered, by 
other facilities and natural elements. 
The prevailing weather conditions required to conduct the analysis of the gaseous 
emissions behavior were obtained from the Meteorological Institute of Costa Rica 
(IMCR), based on several measurements made since the last century. The table below 
shows monthly data on wind speed, ambient temperature and relative humidity. 





Table 1. Weather conditions and ground roughness at Sites A, B and C. 
Month Wind speed (m/s)1 Air temperature (˚C)2 Humidity (%)3 
January 14.9 17.9 83.5 
February 14.4 18.3 81.9 
March 14.1 18.9 81.3 
April 13.0 19.6 82.4 
May 9.4 20.0 85.5 
June 8.9 19.9 86.1 
July 10.6 19.6 86.2 
August 9.3 19.7 86.1 
September 7.4 19.7 86.2 
October 7.8 19.7 86.9 
November 10.2 19.0 87.5 
December 13.2 18.3 85.7 
Average 11.1 19.2 84.9 
 
Thus, for all sites A, B and C, as well as for the location of the hospital, average annual 
wind velocity is 11.1 m/s; the ambient temperature is 19.2°C and the relative humidity is 
84.9%. 
In addition, according to the same data source, it is important to highlight the following 
geographic and meteorological aspects that are needed for the analysis of gaseous 
pollutants, overpressures and thermal radiation through ALOHA: 
 Elevation (above mean sea level): 1,396 m. 
 Offset from local standard time to GMT: +6 hours. 
 Measurement height above ground of the weather station: 10 m.  
 Ground roughness: urban. 
 Wind direction: west-east. 
 Cloud cover (nubosity): partly cloudy. 
 Stability class: D (neutral). 
 No inversion considered. 
                                                          
1 Data collected since 1997 to 2015, IMCR. 
2 Data collected since 1951 to 2014, IMCR. 
3 Data collected since 1993 to 2014, IMCR. 
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3.2. Hazardous chemicals stored at Sites A, B and C and types of accidents 
At Site A, ammonium hydroxide is stored in 30% (w/w) solution; at Site B, nitric acid is 
preserved in solution at 70% (w/w) and Site C contains liquefied dimethylamine within a 
pressurized tank. Based on the analysis that is intended to be performed by ALOHA and 
the data it requires as inputs, the most important properties of the commented substances 
are shown below: 
 
Table 2. Properties of chemicals involved in accidents at Sites A, B and C. 
Characteristic Site A’s chemical, 
aqueous ammonia,  
Site B’s chemical, 
nitric acid,  
Site C’s chemical, 
dimethylamine 
Chemical formula NH₄OH HNO₃ (CH₃)₂NH 





Molecular weight  17.03 g/mol 63.01 g/mol 45.08 g/mol 
AEGL-1 (1 hour) 30 ppm 0.16 ppm 10 ppm 
AEGL-2 (1 hour) 160 ppm 24 ppm 66 ppm 
AEGL-3 (1 hour) 1,100 ppm 92 ppm 250 ppm 
Ambient boiling point 21.6˚C 117.3˚C 3,1˚C 
IDLH 300 ppm 25 ppm 300 ppm 
LEL 150,000 ppm Nonflammable 28,000 ppm 
UEL 280,000 ppm Nonflammable 144,000 ppm 
Vapor pressure --- --- >1 atm 
Partial pressure at 
ambient temperature: 
0.75 atm 0.0038 atm --- 
Ambient saturation 
concentration (ppm) 
88,500 4,441 1,000,000 
 
It should be noted that there are evidently in these sites many more chemicals stored but 
these are the most representative of each, according to the queries made regarding their 
hazard and stored amount. Also, as an important fact, note that only the nitric acid 
compound is nonflammable and the only one stored in a pressurized tank is the 
dimethylamine, which is not a solution, as the others are. 





Taking these properties as guides (flammability and storage) and with the objective of 
categorizing the analysis, a hierarchical diagram was made to determine the possible 
accidents that can happen, which is shown below: 
 
Figure 2. Possible accidents according to flammability and storage conditions. 
 
As it can be observed from the above diagram, all accidents happen from failures related 
with tanks and from internal or external events. In case of fires, a jet fire can occur if the 
chemical escapes from the tank and immediately encounters a source of ignition (spark 
or flame). Also, a BLEVE can happen if an external source boils the tank up and makes 
it explode, which causes a fire ball. Eventually, a pool fire is also possible. 
On the other hand, the containing of the tanks can spill due to a hole (break) or failure in 
a valve, forming pools which can evaporate, burn or filtrate to the ground. If the chemical 
is flammable and the pool makes contact with an ignition source, it can generate a pool 
fire. If not, it can evaporate at its particular rate according with its chemical and physical 
properties. Thus, it can produce a toxic cloud that if encounters a source of ignition and 
the concentration of it is between the explosive limits, a flash fire could happen and 
maybe a blast, too. At any case, the chemical solution could infiltrate to the ground. If the 
chemical of the pool is nonflammable, it just can evaporate (forming a toxic cloud) or 
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In summary, the following table defines the possible accidents that can occur in Sites A, 
B and C and their consequences, taking into account the alternatives of analysis given by 
ALOHA. It includes the model to be applied for each case and the type of parameter it 
will measure, according to the related legislation (Spain, 2003): 
Table 3. Scenarios of accidents at Sites A, B and C.4 
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4 Other possible scenarios like flash fire and blast of aqueous ammonia (flammable chemical) were not 
considerated in this table, because after running the related models in ALOHA, the results are not significant 
or negible. 
5 According to “Real Decreto” 1196/2003. 





3.3. Analysis of accidents at Site A 
To model the accidents in Site A, it is necessary to define the basic storage and release 
conditions of aqueous ammonia. These are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 4. Storage conditions and release of aqueous ammonia by accident at Site A. 
Chemical Aqueous Ammonia 
Type of accident Evaporating pool 
Area of the pool 200 m² 
Volume of the pool 8 m³ 
Ground type Concrete 
Ground temperature 19.2˚C 
Pool temperature Ground temperature 
Realease duration 60 minutes (by default) 
Maximun average sustained release rate 207 kg/min, see Figure 3 
Total amount hazardous component released 1,508 kg 
 
The evaporation rate of the chemical has the following behavior during the leak: 
 
Figure 3. Evaporation rate of aqueous ammonia at Site A (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
From the above, during the first 10 minutes practically 90% of the compound escapes 
from the pool to the atmosphere. Therefore, following consequences could occur: 
 
3.3.1. Toxic area of vapor cloud, scenario 1 
When carrying out the model run (Gaussian), the following dispersion chart of pollutants 
is generated (Figure 4): 
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Figure 4. Toxic cloud of aqueous ammonia due to the accident at Site A. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
It is interpreted from the above that the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-
1 reaches almost 900 linear meters in the direction of the wind (west-east) from the point 
of emission and extends from its central axis to both sides up to 60 linear meters; being 
able to produce in this zone discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory 
effects over the general population (alert zone). 
Also, the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-2 reaches almost 380 linear 
meters in the direction of the wind (west-east) from the point of emission and extends 
from its central axis to both sides up to 26 linear meters, being able to produce in this 
zone irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired 
ability to escape (intervention zone). 
In addition, the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-3 reaches almost 130 
linear meters in the west-east direction from the point of emission and extends from its 
central axis to both sides up to 11 linear meters. Into this zone, the effects ca be life-
threatening health effects or death zone. 
If Figure 4 is superimposed on the location of the hospital’s property, it results as follows 
(Figure 5): 






Figure 5. Area of the toxic cloud of aqueous ammonia due to the 
accident at Site A and its spatial relation with the hospital’s property. 
 
Based on the above, the cloud of aqueous ammonia coming from the spill or break of the 
tank at Site A, would affect the hospital’s property, in the northern sector (main accesses), 
which corresponds to approximately 2.84% of the coverage of the land (4,100 m2 of 
143,932 m2). This fact, for a concentration that only surpasses AEGL-1 (alert zone). 
Evidently, if an accident of this nature happens, even though the toxic cloud would not 
almost impact the hospital’s property, there will be health consequences in those who are 
reached by the air toxicity (in the rest of the industrial-residential zone), because it will 
reach AEGL-2 and AEGL-3. These people will probably attend to the hospital and this 
fact will affect the demand of the healthcare services, so the capacity of response of this 
infrastructura and its effectiveness will be reduced. 
 
3.4.Analysis of accidents at Site B 
To model the accidents in Site B, it is necessary to define the basic storage and release 
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Table 5. Storage conditions and release of nitric acid by accident at Site B 
Chemical Nitric acid 
Type of accident Evaporating pool 
Area of the pool 135 m² 
Volume of the pool 2.25 m³ 
Ground type Concrete 
Ground temperature 19.2˚C 
Pool temperature Ground temperature 
Realease duration 60 minutes (by default) 
Maximun average sustained release rate 1.43 kg/min, see Figure 6 
Total smount hazardous component released 84.9 kg 
 
The evaporation rate of the chemical has the following behavior during the leak: 
 
Figure 6. Evaporation rate of nitric acid at Site B. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
From the above, during the 60 minutes of analysis, the compound escapes from the pool, 
practically at the same rate, so there is enough chemical to continue evaporating after this 
lapse of time. Therefore, following consequences could occur: 
 
3.4.1. Toxic area of vapor cloud, scenario 2 
When carrying out the model run (Gaussian), the following dispersion chart of pollutants 
is generated: 






Figure 7. Toxic cloud of nitric acid due to the accident at Site B. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
It is interpreted from the above that the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-
1 reaches almost 525 linear meters in wind direction (west-east) from the point of 
emission and extends from its central axis to both sides up to 35 linear meters; being able 
to produce in this zone discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory 
effects over the general population (alert zone). AEGL-2 and AEGL-3 are nor reached at 
any point. If Figure 7 is superimposed on the location of the hospital’s property, it results 
as follows (Figure 8): 
 
Figure 8. Area of the toxic cloud of nitric acid due to the accident 
at Site B and its spatial relation with the hospital’s property. 
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Based on the above, if a nitric acid spill accident occurs at Site B, the toxic cloud produced 
would do affect the hospital’s property in the middle sector (main buildings), which 
corresponds to approximately 15.98% the coverage of the land (11,500 m2 of 143,932 
m2). In this case, concentration only surpasses AEGL-1 (alert zone). 
 
3.5. Analysis of accidents at Site C 
To define the accidents in Site C, it is necessary to define the basic conditions of the 
dimethylamine. These aspects are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 6. Storage conditions and release of dimethylamine by accident at Site C  
Chemical Dimethylamine 
Type of accident Various 
Kind of tank Vertical cylinder 
Diameter 1.2 m 
Length 3.05 m 
Volume: 3.45 m³ 
State of the chemical Liquid 
Temperature within the tank Ambient temperature 
Mass in the tank 2 ton 
Liquid volumen 2.76 m³ 
Percentage full by volume 80% 
Shape that best represents the opening through 
which the pollutant is exiting 
Circular opening 
Opening diameter 0.05 m 
Is leak thorugh a hole or short pipe/valve? Valve 
Bottom of the leak 0.4 m 
Release duration 10 min  
Maximun average sustained release rate 214 kg/min, see Figure 9 
Total amount released 1,778 kg 
Note Note: The chemical escaped as a mixtured of 
gas and aerosol (two phase flow) 
 
The conditions assumed for this accident (valve failure, valve opening size, tank filling 
volumes, etc.) are the typical ones that can occur in reality. However, this does not imply 
that different scenarios of hazardous pollutants releasing may occur. In those cases, the 
analysis procedure would be similar. 
 





The evaporation rate of the chemical has the following behavior during the leak: 
 
Figure 9. Evaporation rate of dimethylamine at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
From the above, during the first 10 minutes all the chemical evaporates to the atmosphere, 
without forming a pool first, due to its low boiling point (3.1°C). So, an analysis of 60 
minutes by default in unnecessary. Therefore, following consequences could occur: 
 
3.5.1. Toxic area of vapor cloud, scenario 3 
When carrying out the model run (heavy gas), the following dispersion chart of pollutants 
is generated: 
 
Figure 10. Toxic cloud of dimethylamine due to the accident at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
It is interpreted from the above that the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-
1 reaches almost 1,890 linear meters in the direction of the wind (west-east) from the 
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point of emission and extends from its central axis to both sides up to 98 linear meters; 
being able to produce in this zone discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-
sensory effects over the general population (alert zone). 
Also, the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-2 reaches almost 700 linear 
meters in the direction of the wind (west-east) from the point of emission and extends 
from its central axis to both sides up to 40 linear meters, being able to produce in this one 
Irreversible zone or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired 
ability to escape (intervention zone). 
In addition, the toxic cloud whose concentration exceeds AEGL-3 reaches almost 335 
linear meters in the west-east direction from the point of emission and extends from its 
central axis to both sides up to 23 linear meters, being able to produce life-threatening 
health effects or death zone. 
If Figure 10 is superimposed on the location of the hospital’s property, it results as follows 
(Figure 11):   







Figure 11. Area of the toxic cloud of dimethylamine due to the accident at Site C and its spatial relation with the hospital’s property. 
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Based on the above, if a leakage of dimethylamine occurs in Site C, the toxic cloud 
produced would not affect the hospital’s property, although it would affect the urban 
sector to the east of the site of emission up to a distance of almost 2.8 km, in 
concentrations exceeding from AEGL-1 to AEGL-3. 
Obviously if an accident of this nature happens, even though the toxic cloud would not 
almost impact the hospital’s property, there will be health consequences in those who are 
reached by the air toxicity (in the rest of the industrial-residential zone). These peolple 
will attend the hospital and it will directly affect the demand of the healthcare services, 
so the capacity of response of this infrastructura and its effectiveness will be reduced. 
 
3.5.2. Flammable area of vapor cloud, scenario 4 
When carrying out the model run (heavy gas), the following dispersion chart of pollutants 
is generated: 
 
Figure 12. Flammable area of vapor cloud of dimethylamine  
due to the accident at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
Based on the above graph, it is observed that the flammable area of vapor cloud is present 
and reaches the yellow zone (10% LEL, enough to burn), which has a maximum distance 
of 84 linear meters in the direction of the wind (west-east) from the point of emission and 
extends from its central axis to both sides up to 10 linear meters. Due to its short extension 





and the wind direction, this accident would not affect the hospital’s property, because it 
would almost exclusively be limited to the site of the emission. 
 
3.5.3.  Blast Area of Vapor Cloud, scenario 5 
When carrying out the model run (heavy gas), the following dispersion chart of blast area 
of vapor cloud explosion ignited by spark or flame is generated: 
 
Figure 13. Blast area of steam cloud explosion ignited by spark or flame 
at Site C and its spatial relation with the hospital’s property. 
 
Based on the above graph, it is observed that the blast area of vapor cloud explosion 
ignited by spark or flame only reaches the yellow zone (greater than 0.725 psi), which 
corresponds with alert zone. The blast has a maximum length of 16 linear meters and 
extends from its central axis to both sides up to 4.5 linear meters. 
Due to its relationship with the flammable area of vapor cloud (scenario 4) and according 
to its short extension and the wind direction, this accident would not affect the hospital’s 
property, because it would exclusively be limited to the site of the emission. 
 
3.5.4. Leaking tank (jet fire), scenario 6 
For the jet fire’s scenario, it was modeled using thermal radiation values given by “Real 
Decreto 1196/2003” (see Attachment 5). An exposure of 30 seconds was chosen because 
it is a magnitude that exists in legislation for both, alert and intervention zone. 
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The burning rate of the chemical has the following behavior during the jet fire (which is 
directly related with the time of leakage, 10 minutes). 
 
Figure 14. Burning rate of dimethylamine for a jet fire at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
When carrying out the model run, the following thermal radiation chart is generated: 
 
Figure 15. Thermal radiation caused by a jet fire accident involving 
dimethylamine at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
It is interpreted from the above that the thermal radiation -for a 30 second exposure- is 
round shaped and tends to follow the wind direction, being the most of it to the east of 
the source. The alert zone (yellow color), in which this radiation is greater than 3 kW/m2, 
has a radius of approximately 23 linear meters. With regard to the intervention zone, in 
which the radiation is more than 5 kW/m2, has a radius of approximately 17 linear meters. 





Due to its short extension and the wind direction, this accident would not affect the 
hospital’s property, because it would almost exclusively be limited to the site of the 
emission. 
It is important to clarify that the simulated jet fire is flame shaped, has a maximun length 
of 18 meters and lasts 10 minutes burning. Nevertheless, Figure 15 is about the thermal 
radiation produced as a result from this jet fire, not a drawing of it. It assumes a hole in 
any point of the tank circunference. 
 
3.5.5. Leaking tank (BLEVE and fireball/pool fire), scenario 7 
For the BLEVE’s scenario, it was assumed an external fire event that provokes the 
explosion of the dimethylamine’s tank. It is typical that 80% of the gas leaking in the 
explosion forms the fireball and the remaining 20% constitutes a subsequent pool fire. At 
BLEVE, ALOHA automatically calculates that the internal pressure of the tank is 62.6 
psi, and that its temperature reaches 48.0°C at that time prior to the fireball. Regarding 
the latter, thermal radiation limits given by “Real Decreto 1196/2003” (see Attachment 
5) were used. An exposure of 30 seconds was chosen because it is a magnitude that exists 
in legislation for both, alert and intervention zones. When carrying out the model run, the 
following thermal radiation chart is generated: 
 
Figure 16. Thermal radiation caused by an accident with  
fireball involving dimethylamine at Site C. (ALOHA, 2016). 
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It is interpreted from the above that the alert zone (yellow color), in which the thermal 
radiation is greater than 3 kW/m2, has a radius of approximately 250 linear meters. With 
regard to the intervention zone, in which the thermal radiation is more than 5 kW/m2, has 
a radius of approximately 190 linear meters. It must be highlighted, that the fireball has a 
diameter of 66 linear meters and its burning time lasts 6 seconds. If Figure 16 is 
superimposed on the location of the hospital’s property, it results as follows (Figure 17):  
 
Figure 17. Fireball’s thermal radiation caused by an accident involving dimethylamine 
at Site C and its spatial relation with the hospital’s property. (ALOHA, 2016). 
 
Based on the above, a thermal radiation from fireball of a half kilometer diameter can be 
generated for 30 seconds exposition time. That is, not only affects a 23.56 % of the 
hospital’s property (33,914 m2 land area of 143,932 m2), but also the out-of-hospital 
coverage that surround it in 110,033.37 m2. For all this area, the thermal radiation values 
for both, alert and intervention zone, are reached. 
One again, it is observed that this accident not only affects the hospital directly. Also, 
there will be health consequences in those who are reached by the thermal radiation in 
the specified dosage (for the people in the rest of the industrial-residential places). 
Finally, the resultant pool fire has a diameter of 12 linear meters and its burning time lasts 
56 seconds. There are no more details about the thermal radiation produced by the pool 
fire. 





3.6.Summary of the analysis 
Taking into account the simulated accidents in the different scenarios and considering 
only direct impact on the coverage of the hospital, the following table summarizes the 
results: 
Table 7. Results of accident scenarios at Sites A, B and C. 





area (m2) of 
the hospital 
1 
Evaporating pool of aqueous 










Leaking tank (not burning) – 
dimethylamine 
Toxic area of vapor cloud 
None 
4 
Flammable area of vapor 
cloud (flash fire) 
5 
Blast area of vapor cloud 
explosion 
6 
Leaking tank (jet fire) – 
dimethylamine 
Thermal radiation area 
7 
Leaking tank (BLEVE and 







Based on the above, the hospital as such, is affected directly in the simulations of 
accidents 1, 2 and 7. However, the surroundings are hit by gaseous pollutants, 
overpressures, and thermal radiation in the different scenarios, so this affects the 
hospital’s capacity of response in case of emergency. Therefore, intervention (preventive 
and corrective) actions are needed to mitigate or eliminate the risk of happening of any 
scenario. 
                                                          
6 AEGL-1 (alert zone): General population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable 
discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling 
and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. This area is related with perceptible effects by 
the population, but their magnitudes do not justify the intervention, except for critical population groups. 
 
7 In addition to the alert zone, the intervention zone is related to an area with consequences of accidents 
that produce a level of damages which justify the immediate application of measures of protection. 
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Regarding to the wind direction confidence lines drawn because of the analysis of 
scenarios 1-6, it is shown how the toxic cloud and the distribution of the overpressure 
produced, have a considerable range of displacement due to typical variations in the 
direction of the wind, Therefore, the mentioned results of the simulations are not static or 
definitive, but are only guidance. 
However, if the variations in wind direction are drastic (which might be feasible), the 
distribution of the affectation could be very different and scenarios in which there was no 
impact to the hospital’s property, they could have. In fact, it does not seem advisable to 
unify industrial production areas where hazardous chemicals are managed, with 
residences and hospitals in the same population area. 
 
4. Conclusions 
a) In general, the predominant direction of the wind makes that the affections caused on 
the hospital by the accidents at Sites A and C (involving aqueous ammonia and 
dimethylamine), are minimal or null in the dispersion of toxic clouds. On the contrary, 
with the predominant wind direction, a release in Site B (nitric acid) produces a cloud 
of vapors from nitric acid that goes through the hospital’s property right in the middle 
and distributes within it, almost completely. In this case, the concentration of toxic 
clouds would only reach AEGL-1 (alert zone), so these effects are not disabling and 
are reversible upon cessation of exposure. Nevertheless, due to the characteristics of 
the patients in a place like this, they can be considered as a critical population group. 
b) The flammable vapor cloud, the blast area of vapor cloud and jet fire’s thermal 
radiation threat zone caused by accidents at Site C (related with dimethylamine) do 
not reach the hospital’s property and are practically distributed within the boundaries 
of the industrial company (very close to the source). 
c) The most dangerous case for hospital impact is BLEVE and fireball/pool fire at Site 
C. According to the consequences to human health, the fireball produces thermal 
radiation that exceeds the reaches intervention zone (pain, burns of second degree and 
death). It could also destroy the facilities, so in such a situation, the hospital would be 
physically disabled. 
d) As mentioned before, a hospital can never stop working and must also be solvent in 
dealing with emergency situations. Therefore, any impact to human health of people 





outside the hospital’s property (in any of the scenarios) will indirectly affect this 
facility, as these people will attend to it for medical care and will saturate its services. 
This means that as part of the operations and organization of the hospital, it is 
necessary to plan and anticipate what to do in such case. If the hospital does not have 
sufficient response capacity to care for those affected, it will have to refer them to 
other health centers, consuming resources and valuable time that would put the people 
at greater risk. 
e) Variations in wind direction could change the distribution of the consequences on the 
hospital’s property (for all the simulated scenarios). Because of this, it is for sure that 
the obtained results are not static or definitive. So, considering hospital patients as a 
critical population group and according to the “Real Decreto 1196/2003”, it is not 
advisable to unify industrial production areas where hazardous chemicals are 




For Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social: 
a) Considering the results of this project but without taking into account the “Real 
Decreto 1196/2003” (because it does not apply for Costa Rica), to promote a 
teamwork with agrochemical industry companies that surround the hospital, to assess 
the risk of toxic, radiative or overpressure pollution, if case of accidents related with 
spills, leaks, fires, and explosions, originated in the facilities of these companies. To 
do this, it would be necessary to work with real data of substances and quantities, as 
well as to have access to the factories and warehouses, to obtain reliable results. The 
study can be extended to other facilities at risk such as close gasoline service stations. 
If the “Real Decreto 1196/2003” were applied in Costa Rica, locating a hospital within 
alert zones provoked by industrial accidents would not be allowed. 
b) In view of the above and given that the hospital has not been designed yet, to 
incorporate in the construction plans, solutions in infrastructure and resistance of 
materials to the fire, suitable electromechanical connections and many other aspects 
that mitigate the impact of the accidents considered in this Mater`s Final Project. 
c) To promote an emergency care commission, in coordination with the industry 
surrounding the hospital, to develop an articulated response plan for addressing 
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possible accidents of spills, leaks, fires, and explosions, which affect not only the 
hospital but also to the residential and industrial zone.  
 
For the agrochemical companies at Sites A, B, and C, to promote the security of the 
infrastructure, their occupants and neighbors, and to benefit the business economy (given 
that it is cheaper to prevent than to correct), it is recommended: 
d) On a periodic and planned basis, conduct a detailed review of the facilities to 
determine the likelihood of accidents occurring from containers containing liquid 
chemicals, continuous leaks in pressurized tanks, fires, and explosions. 
e) Based on the above, to generate a plan to apply preventive and corrective actions in 
order to reinforce primary control systems through operational tasks or projects. 
Consider at least the aspects that can be consulted in Attachment 6. 
f) To update their facilities, considering the “Manual de Disposiciones Técnicas 
Generales Sobre Seguridad Humana y Protección Contra Incendios" developed by the 
Unidad de Ingeniería de Bomberos del Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos de Costa 
Rica. This mandatory document is used in the design and construction of all civil 
works projects destined to occupy people temporarily or permanently, whether new 
buildings or remodeling excepting residential single-family units, and for the design 
and installation of fire systems (both, active and passive protection), in the 
organization of events in which a concentration of more than 50 people is projected, 
and in the safety inspections carried out by the authorities. The above, according to 
Decreto No. 37615-MP, Gaceta No. 66 of April 5th, 2013, which informs that the 
Benemérito Cuerpo de Bomberos de Costa Rica adopts and incorporates the NFPA 
(National Fire Protection Association) standards that correspond. 
 
6. Nomenclature 
AEGL, Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Airborne Chemicals. 
BLEVE, Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. 
CCSS, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. 
CPR, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters. 
ERPG, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. 
IMCR, Meteorological Institute of Costa Rica. 
LEL, Lower Explosive Limit. 





LOCs, Levels of Concern. 
MAGRAMA, Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente de España. 
Nowadays, it is known as MAPAMA, Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, Alimentación y 
Medio Ambiente de España. 
MFP, Master’s Final Project. 
NOOA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
TEEL, Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits. 
UEL, Upper Explosive Limit. 
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Accidents with toxic substances: 
a) Evaporating pool. It happens when a liquid substance at ambient temperature spills 
on a surface (depending on where it is), forming a pool and tends to evaporate 
according to its physical properties. If the liquid is flammable and comes into contact 
with an ignition source, a fire pool may occur. It is interesting to determine the 
concentrations and dimensions of the toxic cloud that is formed in the accident site 
by applying an appropriate gas model (Gaussian or heavy gas) for dispersion of 
pollutants in the air, as well as an analysis of thermal radiation if the fire pool happens. 
(Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
 
b) Leaking tank (not burning). If the compound is a gas at ambient temperature but it 
is storaged as a pressurized liquid or if it is cooled due to that its boiling point is under 
the ambient temperature, an accidental opening in the container or a fail in the valve 
that retains it, will make it to evaporate until the pressures and temperatures internal 
and external to the tank were balanced, generating a continuous leak and forming a 
toxic cloud. It is necessary to determine their concentrations and the dimensions of it, 
from the site of the accident. The analysis can be performed using an appropriate gas 
model (Gaussian or heavy gas) for dispersion of pollutants in the air. (Nolan, 2011 
and ALOHA, 2016). 





Accidents with flammable and toxic substances: 
a) Flash fire. When a flammable vapor cloud encounters an ignition source, the cloud 
can catch fire and burn rapidly in what is called a flash fire. Potential hazards 
associated with a flash fire include thermal radiation, smoke, and toxic byproducts 
from the fire. In this accident, it is important to estimate the flammable area of the 
vapor cloud (the area where a flash fire could occur at some time after the release 
begins). Its analysis can be performed using an appropriate gas model (Gaussian or 
heavy gas) for dispersion of pollutants in the air. (Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
b) Blast. It occurs when a flammable chemical is released into the atmosphere, it forms 
a vapor cloud that will disperse as it travels downwind. If the cloud encounters an 
ignition source, the parts of the cloud where the concentration is within the flammable 
range (between the Lower and Upper Explosive Limits) will burn. The speed at which 
the flame front moves through the cloud determines whether it is a deflagration or a 
detonation. In some situations, the cloud will burn so fast that it creates an explosive 
force (blast wave). The severity of a vapor cloud explosion depends on the chemical, 
the cloud size at the time of ignition, the type of ignition, and the congestion level 
inside the cloud. Its analysis can be performed using an appropriate gas model 
(Gaussian or heavy gas) for dispersion of pollutants in the air and explosions. (Nolan, 
2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
c) Jet fire. A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when a flammable chemical 
is rapidly released from an opening in a container and immediately catches on fire 
(much like the flame from a blowtorch). It produces a stationary flame of great length 
and small width, like that of a blower, which is kept constant until the fuel is 
exhausted. It is the same phenomenon that applies to security torches to eliminate 
unwanted byproducts or excess gases. It has a limited range, but it is especially 
dangerous as far as the domino effect is concerned, since the flame is directional and 
constant. In this case, it is important to estimate the magnitude and size of the thermal 
radiation produced from the accident site, so its analysis is done using an exclusive 
model for jet fires. (Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
d) BLEVE and fireball. It occurs when a tank containing a liquefied gas fails 
completely, as a result of the contents of the tank heating up (by the action of an 
external source). Some of the released flammable chemical will burn in a fireball, 
while the remainder will form a pool fire. The amount of the chemical involved in the 
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fireball and/or the pool fire will depend on the conditions at the time of release. In this 
case, it is important to estimate the reach of the fireball and the magnitude and size of 
the thermal radiation produced from the accident site, so its analysis is done using an 
exclusive model for fireballs. (Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
e) Pool fire. It occurs when a flammable liquid forms a pool on the ground and catches 
on fire. It can also occur on water. In this case, it is important to estimate the time of 
burning, amount of burned chemical, the dimensions of the pool fire, the magnitude 
and coverage of the thermal radiation produced from the source, so its analysis is done 
using an exclusive model for pool fires. (Nolan, 2011 and ALOHA, 2016). 
 
Attachment 2 
 AEGL-1: It is the airborne concentration -expressed as parts per million or milligrams 
per cubic meter (ppm or mg/m³)- of a substance above which it is predicted that the 
general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable 
discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects. However, the 
effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. 
The coverage that reaches this parameter is called alert zone. This area is related with 
perceptible effects by the population, but their magnitudes do not justify the 
intervention, except for critical population groups.  
 AEGL-2: It is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m³) of a substance 
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 
individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health 
effects or an impaired ability to escape. The coverage that reaches this parameter is 
called intervention zone. This area is related with consequences of accidents that 
produce a level of damages which justify the immediate application of measures of 
protection. 
 AEGL-3: It is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m³) of a substance 
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible people, 
could experience life-threatening health effects or death.  
 ERPG-1: It is the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing more than mild, 
transient adverse health effects or without perceiving a clearly defined objectionable 
odor. The coverage that reaches this parameter is called alert zone. 





 ERPG-2: It is the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing 
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an 
individual's ability to take protective action. The coverage that reaches this parameter 
is called intervention zone. 
 ERPG-3: It is the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-
threatening health effects.  
 TEEL-1: It is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m³) of a substance 
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 
individuals, when exposed for more than one hour, could experience notable 
discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, nonsensory effects. However, these 
effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. 
The coverage that reaches this parameter is called alert zone. 
 TEEL-2: It is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m³) of a substance 
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 
individuals, when exposed for more than one hour, could experience irreversible or 
other serious, long-lasting, adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape. The 
coverage that reaches this parameter is called intervention zone. 
 TEEL-3: It is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m³) of a substance 
above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 
individuals, when exposed for more than one hour, could experience life-threatening 
adverse health effects or death.  
Attachment 3 
It must be said that the “Comisión Técnica de Prevención y Reparación de Daños 
Medioambientales de la Dirección General de Calidad y Evaluación Ambiental y Medio 
Natural del Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente de España” 
developed a document entitled “Análisis de herramientas de evaluación de la difusión y 
comportamiento de agentes químicos en el marco de la normativa de responsabilidad 
medioambiental”. In this document, a set of selection criteria was proposed that would 
help to choose from the available market offer of simulators, the most appropriate 
software to model the behavior of the agents causing the damage in the vectors soil, water 
(superficial and ground water) and atmosphere. The above, according to the requirements 
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requested at Ley 26/2007 of October 23, on Environmental Responsibility. In the 
analysis, the simulation models available on the market were classified as follows: 
 Analytical models, also known as screen models. Useful for a first approach to the 
problem focused on decision making. Generally, the equations considered in this type 
of models allow to obtain a simple result. They try one or two-dimensional 
simulations and are reasonably demanding as to the need for input data. These models 
are easy-to-use and do not require complex input data packages, because are based on 
very simplified starting assumptions (homogeneous and isotropic media). The 
absence or difficulty of obtaining the input data is, in most cases, a basic decision 
criterion for the use of this type of models. 
 Numerical models. They require more complex input data, so obtaining or processing 
this information is significantly more difficult than in analytical models and tend to 
require more time for their correct application. Their use generally involves obtaining 
specific data from the facility by conducting field tests. They allow 3D simulations 
and are often used for complex conceptual models, in which spatial and temporal 
variations are considered. Although these models theoretically give a more realistic 
result than the analytical models, they require a more exhaustive analysis in the initial 
phase of development of the conceptual model, which generally requires an expert 
user. 
Among the criteria studied to compare each model are: human factor (organizational 
scope, individual area), activities / facilities (storage, production processes and facilities, 
auxiliary processes and facilities), external elements (natural, infrastructure and supplies, 
socioeconomic aspects, atmosphere, soil, groundwater, surface water, habitat, wild 
species, soils), product or substance, amount involved, physical characteristics, 
conditions of service, prevention and control systems, means and time of intervention, 
meteorological conditions, hydrogeological conditions, reference levels and routes of 
exposure. 
Finally, the adequacy to the conceptual model of the installation was assessed, the 
accident hypotheses raised, the availability of the input data and the need for experience 
or technical knowledge for the application of certain models. 





After having identified the models available on the market with regard to the atmospheric 
dispersion of pollutants and having made a pre-selection (SCREEN 3, ALOHA, 
AERMOD, CALPUFF, PHAST, EFFECTS, CAMEO and DEGADIS), it was concluded 
that the more functional software was ALOHA for the case of analytical models and the 
PHAST for the numerical ones. 
Since ALOHA is a free software, whose implementation offers technically appropriate 
results in the determination of contaminant immission levels from accident simulation, 
its use was recommended by the “Comisión Técnica de Prevención y Reparación de 
Daños Medioambientales”. If someone wants to do further analysis (which will require 
more input and greater technical knowledge of the tool), PHAST is better and is not in 
the inventory of applications acquired by the University of Barcelona. 
Based on the above, it was considered for purposes of the present work that the ALOHA 
could fulfill the expectations for a preliminary analytical simulation and in case of 
throwing important risk results, one could choose to deepen specific accidental situations 
with other software and with the accompaniment of the government and the private 
companies that had relation with the cases. 
 
Attachment 4 
The reference values from the point of view of losses in facilities that delimit the zones 
of overpressure are: 
 Overpressure ≥ 1.813 psi (125 mbar), intervention zone.  
 Overpressure ≥ 0.725 psi (50 mbar), alert zone.  
Attachment 5 
The reference values from the point of view of human health that delimit the zones of 
thermal radiation are: 
 Intervention zone: delimits the area around the fire dart subjected to a radiation of 5 
kW/m2 with a maximum exposure time of 30 seconds. This applies for a thermal 
radiation dosage of 250 (kW/m2)4/3∙s. 
 Intervention zone: delimits the area around the fire dart subjected to a radiation of 3 
kW/m2 with a maximum exposure time of 30 seconds. This applies for a thermal 
radiation dosage of 115 (kW/m2)4/3∙s. 
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Actions to reinforce primary control systems (those that act on the amount involved in a 
possible accident and also on the probability of that accident occurring): 
 Inventory of chemicals being handled. 
 Evaluation of the location of the facilities with each other and identification of the 
activities carried out in them (processing, storage, services, human resources, loading, 
and unloading). 
 Disposal of electromechanical equipment and containers with hazardous chemicals 
with respect to safety distances in order to avoid injury to people (personnel or 
neighbors), internal facilities and external properties. 
 Adequacy of equipment and facilities. That is, the construction and characteristics of 
facilities and equipment should be in accordance with their function. Consideration 
should be given to: plant distribution according to purpose, adequate access, escape 
routes, compartmentalization, selection of building materials, electrical installation, 
fire doors, minimizing the possibility of spills and losses. The equipment must be 
equipped with the necessary detection and control instrumentation (automation). 
 Prevention and protection against fire. To do this: avoid the concentration of large 
quantities of flammable products and separate incompatible products; disperse the 
storage; compartmentalize areas; include remote operated isolating valves; store 
liquefied gases at low pressure and temperature; separate the sources of ignition from 
the areas with flammable materials and orient them so that the wind does not direct 
the flames towards the flammable ones; consider safety and exit areas at reasonable 
distances from the possible fire outbreak; have sufficient sloped deposit for the spill 
to slide into the bucket; have suitable blocks: diameter, slope, distance from the tank; 
apply thermal insulation to chemical deposits; reduce retention of substances in 
process equipment; inert chemicals in case of leak; keep facilities ventilated; promote 
open facilities to prevent the accumulation of flammable vapors; controlling static 
electricity; place fire equipment separate from potentially dangerous equipment but 
at the same time with easy access to it; bury water pipes in the fire system and have 
adequate fixed and portable extinction equipment. 
 Prevention and protection against explosions. About this: avoid overfilling containers; 
promote natural ventilation; avoid contamination of products and equipment; install 
gas detectors; apply measures to isolate, cut and disperse leaks; control chemical 





reactions to prevent explosions; control the reaction temperature and consider 
depressurizing and insulation system. 
 Prevention and protection against spills and leaks. If a liquid is spilled: have buckets 
in the storage tanks and have the possibility of transfer of product from one tank to 
another in case of breakage; collect the purges by pumping systems and put small 
deposits so that the chemical does not fall to the ground and infiltrate; use foams to 
prevent spilled liquid from escaping; incorporate instruments and materials that allow 
product adsorption and minimize the effects of the spill such as tubular, pillows, mats, 
rolls, special adsorbents, solidifying granules, skimmers, pumps and vacuum cleaners. 
If the size of the deposits is reduced, the evaporation surface area is minimized and 
the emission of the contaminant will be reduced and consequently the toxic cloud will 
also be decreased. 
 
